Contract-Based Integration of Cyber-Physical Analyses

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
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Outline


- Analysis integration problem
- Analysis contracts approach
 - Specification
 - Verification
- Experimental results

Model integration in CPS




- Subtle mismatches between technical domains
- Lead to costly fixes or failures

Analytic aspect of integration



- Frequency scaling is applicable only when:
 - used after Bin packing
 - the system is behaviorally deadline-monotonic
- Otherwise, frequency scaling may render the system not schedulable
- Hence, model consistency is not sufficient

Analysis integration problem




- Out-of-order execution
- Invalidation of assumptions


Existing solutions


- Assume-guarantee component composition does not handle analytic integration of tools [1][2].
- Architectural views tackle model consistency, not analytic tool consistency [3][4]
- Meta-level AADL languages do not allow domain-specific semantics [5]
- Previous work on contracts: single domain only, unsound and incomplete verification [6]
 - [1] Frehse et al. Assume-guarantee reasoning for hybrid I/O-automata by over-approximation of continuous interaction, 2004
 - [2] Sangiovanni-Vincentelli et al. Taming Dr. Frankenstein: contract-based design for cyber-physical systems, 2013
 - [3] Torngren et al. Integrating viewpoints in the development of mechatronic products, 2013
 - [4] Rajhans et al. Supporting heterogeneity in cyber-physical systems architectures, 2014
 - [5] Boddy et al. The FUSED meta-language and tools for complex system engineering, 2011
 - [6] Nam et al. Resource allocation contracts for open analytic runtime models, 2011


Running example

Scheduling











Battery





Outline

- Analysis integration problem
- Analysis contracts approach
 - Specification
 - Verification
- Experimental results

Analysis contracts approach


- Formalize analysis domains
- Specify dependencies and assumptions of analyses
- Determine correct ordering of analyses
- Verify assumptions of analyses


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
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
Running example

Scheduling












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






Verification domain

Scheduling domain σ_{sched}











Battery domain σ_{batt}





Verification domain

- Domain σ is a many-sorted signature (\mathcal{A} , \mathcal{S} , \mathcal{R} , \mathcal{T} , { } $_{\sigma}$):
 - A: set of sorts system elements and standard sorts
 - E.g.: \mathfrak{B} , \mathbb{Z} , Threads, Batteries, SchedPol
 - $S: \mathcal{A}_i \times ... \times \mathcal{A}_n \to \mathcal{A}_k$ static functions that encode design properties
 - E.g.: Period, Dline, CPUBind, Voltage
 - \mathcal{R} ; $\mathcal{A}_i \times ... \times \mathcal{A}_n \to \mathcal{A}_k$ runtime functions that encode dynamic properties
 - E.g.: CanPrmpt: Threads x Threads → B
 TN: Batteries x Z → Z

Verification domain

- Domain σ is a many-sorted signature (\mathcal{A} , \mathcal{S} , \mathcal{R} , \mathcal{T} , { } $_{\sigma}$):
 - T: execution semantics set of sequences of R assignments
 - E.g.: thread scheduler state model for σ_{sched} battery state model for for σ_{batt}
 - $\{\![\,]\!\}_{\sigma}$: domain interpretation for $\mathcal A$ and $\mathcal S$
 - E.g.: $\{SchedPol\}_{\sigma} = \{RMS, DMS, EDF\}$
- Architectural model ${\bf m}$ is an interpretation $\{\!\{\}\!\}_{\bf m}$ of ${\mathcal A},\,{\mathcal S},$ and ${\mathcal T}$
 - E.g.: ${Threads}_{m} = {SensorSample, Ctrl_1, Ctrl_2}$ ${CPUBind}_{m} = {(Ctrl_1, CPU_1), (Ctrl_2, CPU_2), ...}$
 - {{}}_σ ∪ {{}}_m is a full interpretation

Analysis contract


- Given a domain σ, analysis contract C is a tuple (I, O, A, G)
 - Inputs $I \subseteq \mathcal{A} \cup \mathcal{S}$
 - Outputs $\mathbf{O} \subseteq \mathcal{A} \cup \mathcal{S}$
 - Assumptions $\mathbf{A} \subseteq \mathcal{F}_{\sigma}$
 - Guarantees $\mathbf{G} \subseteq \mathcal{F}_{\sigma}$
- Where:
 - $\mathcal{F}_{\sigma} ::= \{ \forall |\exists \} \ \lor_{1} ... \lor_{n} \bullet \phi \mid \{ \forall |\exists \} \ \lor_{1} ... \lor_{n} \bullet \phi : \psi$
 - ϕ is a static logical formula over ${\mathcal A}$ and ${\mathcal S}$
 - ψ is an LTL formula over \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{S} , and \mathcal{R}
- \mathcal{F}_{σ} semantics is given in a standard way
 - : means \Rightarrow in case of \forall , and Λ in case of \exists

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Contract I/O dependencies


Scheduling





Frequency scaling assumption


Behavioral equivalence to deadline-monotonic scheduling:

∀ t₁, t₂: Threads • t₁ ≠ t₂ ∧ CPUBind(t₁) = CPUBind(t₂) :
 G (CanPrmpt(t₁, t₂) ⇒ Dline(t₁) < Dline(t₂))










Assumption verification

- SMT solver finds solutions for static fragment φ
 - \forall t₁, t₂:Threads | t₁ ≠ t₂ \land CPUBind(t₁) = CPUBind(t₂)
- Model checking property ψ in a behavioral Promela model for each SMT solution:
 - G ($CanPrmpt(t_1, t_2) \Rightarrow Dline(t_1) < Dline(t_2)$)


Battery modeling

Battery



- Abstraction: circuits
- Selects a scheduler for cell connections
- Oblivious of heat: treats any configuration as acceptable heat-wise


- Restrictions on acceptable thermal configurations
- Guarantee: unacceptable ones don't occur



- Abstraction: geometry
- Simulates heat propagation
- Cannot scale to dynamic scheduling: simulates only fixed cell configurations

Battery scheduling guarantee

"Bad" thermal configurations not reachable




- $TN(b, i) \in \mathcal{R}$ number of cells in b with i thermal neighbors
- $K(b, i) \in S$ experimental coefficient for TN(b, i)
- Guarantee:

 \forall b: Batteries • G ($\sum_{i=0..3} K(b, i) *TN(b, i)$) \geq 0

Battery modeling

Battery




Selects a battery scheduler Guarantee: \forall b: $Batteries \cdot G (\sum_{i=0...3} K(b, i) *TN(b, i)) \ge 0$ | Verified with battery Promela/Spin model

Determines K(b, i) via simulation

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Framework implementation



Scalability evaluation

- SMT solving typically takes less than 0.1 second
- Spin model checking times:

$\boldsymbol{\sigma}$	ı	
U	sched	-

Threads	(R/D)MS time	EDF time
3	0.01	0.01
4	0.01	0.52
5	0.07	33.4
6	0.37	2290.0
7	2.18	Out Mem
8	12.4	Out Mem
9	71.2	Out Mem
10	421	Out Mem
11	Out Mem	Out Mem

σ_{batt} :

Cells	FGURR time	FGWRR time	GPWRR time
9	0.13	0.15	0.15
12	0.61	2.34	3.94
16	44	31.4	127
20	1060	619	Out Mem
25	Out Mem	Out Mem	Out Mem

All times are in seconds

Summary

- Analysis integration is error-prone
 - Incorrect ordering
 - Violation of implicit assumptions
- Our solution:
 - Contract specification language
 - Contract verification algorithm
- Effective, extensible, and scalable
- Future work:
 - Assumptions behind ${\mathcal T}$ implementation
 - Analysis contracts for multiple views

Contracts

Security Analysis

```
• An_{sec} \cdot C : I = \{T, ThSecCl\}, O = \{NotColoc\}, A = \emptyset, G = \{g\}
- g : \forall t_1, t_2 \cdot ThSecCl(t_1) \neq ThSecCl(t_2) \Rightarrow t_1 \in NotColoc(t_2)
```

Multiprocessor scheduling: (Binpacking + scheduling)

```
• An_{sched}. C: I = \{T, C, NotColoc, Per, WCET, Dline\}, O = \{CPUBind\}, A = \emptyset, G = \{g\}
- g: \forall t_1, t_2 \cdot t_1 \in NotColoc(t_2) \Rightarrow CPUBind(t_1) \neq CPUBind(t_2)
```

Frequency Scaling

```
• An_{freqsc}.C:I = \{T,C,CPUBind,Dline\},O = \{CPUFreq\},G = \emptyset,A = \{a\}
- a: \forall t_1,t_2 \cdot CPUBind(t_1) = CPUBind(t_2):G(CanPrmpt(t_1,t_2) \Rightarrow Dline(t_1) < Dline(t_2)
```

Model checking periodic program (REK):

- An_{rek} . $C:I = \{T, C, Per, Dline, WCET, CPUBind\}, O = \{ThSafe\}, G = \emptyset, A = \{a_1, a_2\}$
- $a_1: \forall t \cdot Per(t) = Dline(t), \ a_2: \forall t_1, t_2 \cdot G(Canprmpt(t_1, t_2) \Rightarrow G \neg CanPrmpt(t_2, t_1))$

Thermal runaway:

• An_{therm} . $C: I = \{B, BatRows, BatCols, Voltage\}, O = \{K\}, A = \emptyset, G = \emptyset$

Battery Scheduling

- An_{bsched} . $C: I = \{B, BatRows, BatCols\}, O = \{BatConnSchedPol, HasReqLifetime, SeriqlReq, ParalRea\}, A = \emptyset, G = \{g\}$
- $g: G(K(0) \times TN(0) + K(1) \times TN(1) + K(2) \times TN(2) + K(3) \times TN(3) \ge 0$